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Abstract
We use detailed data on exporters from Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay as well
as on their buyers to show that: aggregate exports are disproportionally driven by few
multi-buyers exporters; and each multi-buyer exporter’s foreign sales of any product
in a given destination are in turn accounted for by a dominant buyer. We propose an
analytically solvable multi-country model of endogenous selection in which dominant
exporters, dominant products and dominant buyers emerge in parallel as multi-product
sellers with heterogeneous technologies compete for buyers with heterogeneous needs.
The model not only provides an explanation of the existence of dominant buyers but
also makes specific predictions on how the relative importance of dominant buyers
should vary across export destinations depending on their market size and accessibility.
We show that these predictions are borne out by our data and discuss their welfare
implications in terms of gains from trade.
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1 Introduction
Few firms engage in exporting. Most of those that do sell only a small number of products
to a small number of buyers in a small number of destinations. However, the small group
of exporters selling a lot of products to a lot of buyers in a lot of destinations accounts
for a dominant share of aggregate exports. Analogously, only a small fraction of dominant
products accounts for the bulk of sales by each of those dominant exporters, and only a small
fraction of dominant buyers accounts for the bulk of each dominant exporter’s sales in any
given destination. While the facts concerning dominant exporters and dominant products are
well known (see, e.g., Bernard et al., 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; Bernard et al., 2012;
Mayer et al., 2014), those on dominant buyers have so far remained largely unexplored.1
We document these facts using detailed information on exporters from Costa Rica,
Ecuador and Uruguay as well as on their buyers. As explaining the existence of domi-
nant buyers calls for new theories in which heterogeneous sellers interact with heterogeneous
buyers, we then propose a simple analytically solvable multi-country model of endogenous
selection in which dominant exporters, dominant products and dominant buyers emerge in
parallel as multi-product sellers with heterogeneous technologies compete for buyers with
heterogeneous needs. The model not only provides an explanation of the existence of domi-
nant buyers but also makes specific predictions on how the relative importance of dominant
buyers should vary across destinations depending on their market size and geography. We
finally show that these predictions are indeed borne out by our data and discuss their welfare
implications in terms of gains from trade.
In so doing, we make two distinct contributions to the theory and the empirics of in-
ternational trade with heterogeneous firms. As for theory, on the demand side our model
introduces buyer heterogeneity by merging the ‘representative consumer approach’ to prod-
uct di↵erentiation (Chamberlin, 1933; Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) with the ‘ad-
1We discuss the related literature below.
2
dress (or characteristics) approach’ (Hotelling, 1929; Lancaster, 1966 and 1979).2 Whereas
the former is the current standard in international trade theory, the latter is more popu-
lar in industrial organization, with very few applications to international trade since early
works by Lancaster (1980) and Helpman (1981).3 As in the representative approach, in our
model consumers demand varieties of a horizontally di↵erentiated product (‘love of variety’).
However, as in the address approach, they prefer di↵erent versions of those varieties. Taste
heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that di↵erent versions of the same variety can be
described as points in a characteristics space. Consumers’ preferences are defined over all
potential versions, and each consumer has her own ideal version (‘address’) in the character-
istics space. Aggregate preferences for within-variety diversity arise from the dispersion of
ideal points over the characteristics space and, for a given price vector, a version’s demand
is defined by the mass of consumers preferring that version over the others. In particular,
for each variety there is a measure of ideal versions that, in the wake of Salop (1979), are
located around a circle with consumers uniformly distributed along the circle. However,
unlike Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) but similar to Capozza and Van Order (1978), a
consumer can buy a variable amount of her ideal version of each di↵erentiated variety as
long as this is available in her ideal version. Due to love of variety, the consumer demands
all and only the varieties available in her ideal version.4 A crucial feature of our model that
drives its empirically relevant comparative statics is that demand exhibits variable elasticity
as in Ottaviano et al. (2002).
On the supply side, firms are monopolistically competitive. Following Mayer et al. (2014),
we assume that each firm first chooses in which country to enter as well as which variety
2See Anderson et al. (1991) for a discussion of the pros and cons of di↵erent approaches to product
di↵erentiation.
3See, e.g., Casella and Rauch (2002), Rauch and Casella (2003) and Rauch and Trindade (2003).
4Helpman (1981) adopts a ‘pure’ address model. There is only one di↵erentiated product and the fact that
a consumer has her own ideal version of that product rules out ‘love for variety’ across versions. Anderson et
al. (1991) determine the formal conditions under which address (and discrete choice) models can give rise to
aggregate ‘love for variety’ across versions of the same product when individual preferences for ideal versions
are aggregated at the product level. In this respect, though our demand system violates those conditions,
our approach could be interpreted as capturing the idea of an intermediate level of aggregation between the
individual consumer and the product market as in the marketing literature since Smith (1956).
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and which version of that variety to produce. This defines its ‘core variety’ and the ‘core
version’ of that variety. Then, again upon entry, the firm randomly draws its e ciency in
producing that version. This defines the firm’s ‘core competence’. After having discovered
its core competence, the firm may also decide to produce non-core varieties, serve non-core
customers or export to foreign markets but in all three cases it faces additional costs of ‘pro-
liferation’, ‘adaptation’ or ‘exportation’ respectively. This implies that in equilibrium more
e cient firms produce more varieties, serve more customers and export to more destinations.
Moreover, the number of varieties sold and customers served as well as the distribution of
sales across varieties sold and customer served change across destinations depending on the
toughness of local competition. In particular, tougher competition forces firms to sell fewer
varieties. These are the ones closer to the ‘core variety’ for which the proliferation cost is
lower. In addition, due to variable demand elasticity, tougher competition makes firms skew
the sales of the varieties they keep on producing towards the core ones. Analogously, tougher
competition also forces firms to focus on their ‘core versions’, hence on their ‘core buyers’,
for which the adaptation cost is lower. Due to variable elasticity, it also makes firms skew
their sales towards the core buyers. As a result, consumers whose ideal versions were initially
further away from the firms’ core versions are not served anymore with the corresponding
varieties disappearing from their consumption baskets. This implies a welfare loss in terms
of foregone product variety that is, however, compensated by the availability of new varieties
supplied by new firms as the distance between the core and ideal versions of the new vari-
eties is shorter than the distance between the core and ideal versions of disappeared varieties.
Thanks to the compression of markups, to the selection of firms, varieties and versions, and
to the reallocation of expenditure shares towards core versions, tougher competition also
reduces prices. For all these reasons, average utility increases with the toughness of com-
petition. While the predictions on varieties are analogous to those in Mayer et al. (2014),
those on buyers are novel. These are the predictions we bring to the data.
As for the empirics of international trade, our paper contributes to an emerging literature
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that has started to examine the extensive and intensive margins of exports along the buyer
dimension. Modelling marketing costs and distinguishing the cost needed to reach the first
customer from the one needed to reach additional customers, Arkolakis (2010) exploits the
US-Mexico NAFTA liberalization episode to argue that exports growth materialized through
increases not only in the number of exporters (‘new firm margin’) but also and more impor-
tantly through the number of their customers (‘new consumer margin’). In so doing, he uses
disaggregated product data rather than buyer information.5 Blum et al. (2010 and 2012),
Eaton et al. (2013), Monarch (2014), and Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2016) do make
use of data that identify the buyers, but for di↵erent purposes than ours. In particular, Blum
et al. (2010 and 2012) use data on Chilean exporters and matched Colombian importers to
motivate their model of trade intermediaries. Eaton et al. (2013) use customs data on the
relationships Colombian firms have with their US buyers to quantify several types of trade
costs and learning e↵ects exploring their impacts on aggregate export dynamics. Monarch
(2014) utilizes data on US importers and Chinese exporters to uncover the frictions associ-
ated with changing exporting partners. Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2016) also exploit
US import data to estimate the value of long-term trade relationships for certain countries.
Closer to our paper, Bernard et al. (2017) use export information from Norway to study the
impact of foreign buyers’ size heterogeneity on aggregate trade elasticity.6 However, di↵er-
ently from our paper, their analysis does not deepen the investigation of the firm-product
level and does not cover the distributions of sales across buyers.7
Also related to our analysis are a number of recent studies that examine the relationships
5In Arkolakis (2010) consumers with identical tastes may end up consuming di↵erent CES bundles of
di↵erentiated varieties due to imperfect marketing penetration. In particular, a consumer buys a good only
if she is aware of its existence, and becomes aware of its existence only if she observes a costly ad posted by
its producer. The producer serves the market only if it is profitable to incur the marginal cost to reach at
least one consumer and then incurs an increasing marginal penetration cost to access additional consumers.
Assuming that the marketing technology exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect to population
size but decreasing returns to scale with respect to the number of consumers reached, the model is used to
reconcile the positive relationship between entry and market size with the existence of many small producers.
6Some of our findings concur with those reported by Bernard et al. (2013) for Norwegian exporters.
7Our paper is also related to McCalman (2018) who introduces demand side heterogeneity by relaxing the
assumption of homotheticity and therefore allowing expenditure shares to depend on buyers’ income levels
in addition to relative prices.
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between buyers and sellers in given pairs of countries within specific sectors. Macchiavello
(2010) exploits data on trade relationships between Chilean wine exporters and UK wine
distributors to show how the age and the order of these relationships relate to prices, survival
rates, marketing costs, and distributor characteristics.8 Using transaction-level export data
from Mexico, Sugita et al. (2014) analyze how US and Mexican firms match in the textile and
apparel sectors. Kamal and Sundaram (2015) exploit customs data on transactions between
US importers and Bangladeshi exporters along with information on the geographic location
of the latter to investigate whether business networks among trading firms - as proxied by
geographical proximity - a↵ect exporter-importer matches. All these papers, however, do
not investigate how the cross-country variation in the toughness of competition a↵ects the
distribution of firm export sales across buyers, which is the key focus of our analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing the dataset, Section 2
presents our facts on the buyers margin of exports and multi-buyer exporters. Section 3
introduces the model, derives its predictions on how the relative importance of buyers is
a↵ected by the toughness of competition, and discusses its welfare implications. Section 4
brings those predictions to the data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Exporters and Buyers
Aggregate exports are concentrated in the hands of few dominant exporters selling several
products to several markets (see, e.g., Bernard et al, 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007) and
a small fraction of dominant products accounts for the bulk of sales of any of those dominant
exporters (see, e.g., Mayer et al., 2014). In this section, we show that exporters with a large
pool of foreign buyers are a crucial component of the group of dominant exporters.
In so doing, we rely on three datasets consisting of highly disaggregated annual firm
export data for three di↵erent countries, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay, over the period
8In the same vein, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2014) provide evidence on the importance of reputation
in buyer-seller relationships based on data from the Kenyan rose export sector.
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2005-2008. These customs data are reported at the exporter-product-country-importer level,
providing information on the value and the quantity (weight) shipped of each product (6-digit
HS level) by each exporter to each importer in each destination country.9 They virtually
cover the whole population of exporting firms for our three countries.10
2.1 Buyers in International Trade
A snapshot of our dataset is presented in Table 1. This table reports aggregate export
indicators for the three countries over our sample period. In 2008, Uruguay had more than
2, 000 exporters that sold approximately 3, 000 products to approximately 12, 000 buyers in
160 countries for almost USD 6 billion. In Ecuador, a larger number of exporting firms,
around 4, 000, sold a similar total number of products to a similar number of buyers in a
slightly smaller set of 151 destinations for USD 19 billion. Finally, in Costa Rica, 2, 700
exporters sold around 4, 000 products to almost 15, 000 buyers in 143 countries to generate
total foreign sales over USD 8.5 billion.
The role of buyers in aggregate exports can be examined by extending the approach
proposed by Arkolakis and Muendler (2011) to include the buyer scope. Consider a country
exporting to some destination. Let ‘extensive margin’ refer to the number of exporters,
‘product scope’ to the average number of unique exporter-product combinations per exporter,
‘buyer scope’ to the average number of unique exporter-product-buyer combinations per
unique exporter-product combination, and ‘intensive margin’ to average exports per unique
exporter-product-buyer combination.11 Then, by definition, aggregate exports are equal to
9Original data are reported at the HS-10 digit level. We have aggregated these data to a common HS-6
digit level to ensure consistency across countries and over time.
10In the case of Costa Rica, the sum of the exports of the firms in our database amounts on average to
approximately 90% of the country’s total merchandise exports as reported by the Central Bank of Costa
Rica, with the di↵erence being explained by exports of Gold Co↵ee, which due to administrative reasons
were registered separately, and by the absence of data on the importers’ identity for a few exporters. As for
Ecuador, only a minor portion of oil exports is not included. Regarding Uruguay, the discrepancy of our
data with those from the Statistical O ce never exceeds 1% over the period under analysis.
11Both scopes are equal or greater than one as long as some exporters export more than one product to
the destination and have more than one buyer for some of their products in that destination.
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the product of intensive margin, product scope, buyer scope and intensive margin.12
Table 2 presents the results of this decomposition. When looking at the three countries
together in 2005, the extensive and intensive margins account on average for 44% and 47%
of aggregate exports respectively. The remaining 9% is evenly split between the product
and buyer scopes. This hides some variation across countries as the product scope has more
weight in Costa Rica (7%) and Uruguay (6%) while the buyer scope is more important in
the latter (6%). These magnitudes are remarkable as the decomposition allows the number
of buyers to contribute only at the firm-product level within destination. Moreover, the
buyer scope is larger than the product scope for two out of three countries. A similar
pattern arises when the decomposition is performed over time (2005-2008). In this case, the
extensive and intensive margins account on average for 16% and 79% of aggregate exports
respectively, while the contribution of the buyer scope is consistently larger than that of the
product scope (3% vs. 2% on average across countries with a peak of 8% vs. insignificant
for Uruguay).
Table 3 describes the distribution of export outcomes across firms in the three sample
countries with an emphasis on the role of buyers. For parsimony, we focus on 2005 but similar
patterns emerge for all years in the sample. We consider the following export outcomes:
the numbers of buyers, destinations and products; the numbers of buyers per destination
and per product; average exports per buyer, per destination and per product; and average
exports per destination-product-buyer. For each outcome the first seven columns report key
percentiles while the eighth reports the average. The table shows that the median (average)
Costa Rican exporter sells 2 (5.9) products to 2 (6.9) buyers in 2 (2.9) destinations for USD
35, 000 (2, 173, 000). The median (average) Ecuadorian exporter sells 1 (3.2) products to
1 (4.9) buyers in 1 (2.3) destinations for USD 28, 000 (4, 168, 000). The median (average)
Uruguayan exporter sells 1 (4.4) products to 1 (6.9) buyers in 1 (2.9) destinations for USD
28, 000 (1, 763, 000). Importantly, the percentiles reveal a remarkable heterogeneity in terms
12See Appendix A.3 for a formally description of this decomposition.
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of the number of buyers: most exporters trade with a limited number of foreign buyers and
only few of them serve a wide range of buyers: while exporters in the top decile serve more
than ten buyers in all three countries, at least half of the exporters serve no more than two
buyers.
This concentration in the distribution of the number of buyers across firms is visualized in
Figures 1 and 2. These figures depict the distributions of exporters over the number of buyers
for each country in our sample (Figure 1) as well as at di↵erent aggregation levels pooling
across countries (Figure 2). In particular, Figure 1 shows that single-buyer firms represent
between 40% (Costa Rica) to 57% (Ecuador) of exporters and that the distributions are very
similar across our three countries. Figure 2 reveals that concentration is more pronounced
at finer levels of disaggregation with around 50% of the exporters selling to just one foreign
buyer when all destination countries and products are pooled together. This percentage
rises to around 60% for firm-destination combinations and around 80% for firm-destination-
product combinations.
2.2 Multi-Buyer Exporters
While exporters selling several products to several buyers in several destinations are very
few, they still account for large shares of aggregate exports. This can be seen comparing the
shares of exporters and aggregate exports (Figure 3) that are accounted for by either single-
buyer or multi-buyer exporters. The share of exporters with multiple buyers never exceed
30%, whereas the share of those with only one buyer can reach almost 80%. In contrast, the
share of single-buyer exporters in aggregate exports is always below 20%, whereas that of
multi-buyer exporters can reach almost 90%. In short, multi-buyer exporters account for a
small fraction of the number of exporters but a large fraction of aggregate exports. Hence,
shedding light on the behavior of multi-buyer exporters seems to be crucial for understanding
a key driver of aggregate exports.
This dominance of multi-buyer exporters can be assessed more precisely by regressing
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firms’ exports on a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if the exporter is multi-buyer in
at least one product-destination combination and 0 otherwise along with extensive margin
variables (numbers of destination-product combinations and buyers) and di↵erent sets of
fixed e↵ects as controls. This binary indicator captures the conditional ‘export premium’ of
being multi-buyer. The estimation results are reported in Table 4. The estimated coe cient
on the multi-buyer indicator is positive, significant and similar across countries both in the
cross section (2005) and when pooling across years (2005-2008). Specifically, in the cross
section, the estimate implies that multi-buyer firms export between 70% and 167% more than
single-buyer firms. This multi-buyer export premium is remarkable given that we control
for both the number of product-destinations and the number of buyers. When pooling
across years, estimation suggests that exports by multi-buyer exporters grow on average
13% more than those by single-buyer exporters. The estimates of the multi-buyer premium
remain virtually the same when additionally conditioning by HS2 digit sector(-year) and
destination(-year) fixed e↵ects (see lower panel of Table 4).13
3 A Model of Multi-Buyer Exporters
Explaining the evidence presented in the previous section calls for a model that features het-
erogeneous multi-product sellers serving heterogeneous buyers in various destination coun-
tries. In order to better highlight the interaction between sellers’ and buyers’ heterogeneity,
we start presenting the conceptual framework in closed economy. We will then extend it to
the open economy where also countries’ heterogeneity will come into play.
13Tables reporting these and other estimates of the multi-buyer premium when controlling separately for
the number of products and the number of destinations (instead of the number of product-destination pairs)
as well as those obtained when changing the level of aggregation to firm-country and firm-country-product
and adding correspondingly more demanding fixed e↵ects (such as firm-product and firm-destination in
addition to industry-year fixed e↵ects and destination-year fixed e↵ects) are available from the authors upon
request. In these tables, the multi-buyer premium remains positive and significant and qualitatively similar
to the estimates in Table 4.
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3.1 Buyer Heterogeneity
There are L consumers with preferences defined over a homogeneous good and a continuum
of horizontally di↵erentiated varieties indexed by i 2 I. Each consumer is endowed with a
unit of labor that she inelastically supplies to the market so that L represents not only the
mass of consumers but also total labor supplied. Each consumer is also endowed with y units
of the homogeneous good. Each variety comes itself in versions with di↵erent characteristics
and consumers di↵er in terms of their tastes for these versions.
Taste heterogeneity across consumers is introduced by assuming that a variety’s versions
can be described as points (‘addresses’) in a characteristics space.14 Each consumer has an
‘ideal’ version of the variety and derives utility only from the consumption of that version.
Hence, if her ideal version is not available, the consumer does not demand the variety at
all. The consumer’s tastes are then defined by the set of ideal versions she demands of the
di↵erent varieties. Specifically, we consider a consumer z whose set of ideal versions is Iz ⇢ I.
Her utility function is given by
Uz = yz + ↵
ˆ
i2Iz
qz(i)di   
2
ˆ
i2Iz
[qz(i)]
2 di  ⌘
2
"ˆ
i2Iz
qz(i)di
#2
(1)
where yz is consumption of the homogeneous good, qz(i) is consumption of a variety i with
a version in Iz,   > 0 measures ‘love for variety’, ↵ > 0 and ⌘ > 0 measure the preference
for the di↵erentiated good with respect to the homogeneous good. The initial endowment y
of the homogeneous good is assumed to be large enough for its equilibrium consumption to
be strictly positive.
The characteristics space of a variety’s versions is assumed to be represented by a circle
14While our model with heterogeneous tastes for final goods has a strong business-to-consumer (‘B-to-C’)
flavor, assuming perfectly competitive intermediaries with the same addresses as consumers would allow for
a straightforward business-to-business (‘B-to-B’) reinterpretation. The alternative of modeling buyers as
firms with homogeneous ‘tastes’ for intermediate goods but heterogeneous productivity has been explored
by Bernard, Moxnes and Ullveit-Moe (2017) in the case of CES demand. The CES assumption, however,
rules out the relationships between toughness of competition and sales concentration that our model will
uncover in this section and our empirical analysis will document in Section 4.
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C with each point along C corresponding to the ideal version (‘address’) of some consumer.
The circle has circumference 1 and consumers are uniformly distributed around it so that
there are L consumers sharing any given ideal version. Versions are indexed in a clockwise
manner starting from noon and arranged across varieties so that consumer z’s ideal version
of any variety is indexed z with z 2 [0, 1]. The right hand panel of Figure 4 provides a visual
representation of the characteristics space Ci for a given variety i with version z indexed
clockwise from noon 0 to midnight 1.15 The left hand panel provides, instead, a visual
representation of the entire product space I, emphasizing varieties h, i and j, each with its
own circular characteristics space, as well as consumer z’s address and ideal set Iz.16
3.2 Seller Heterogeneity
Labor is the only input. It can be employed in the production of the homogeneous good by
a perfectly competitive sector facing constant returns to scale with unit labor requirement
equal to 1. This good is chosen as numera`ire and its price is set to one by choice of units.
The assumptions on technology and market structure then imply that also the wage is equal
to 1.
Labor can also be employed in the production of the di↵erentiated varieties by a mo-
nopolistically competitive sector. In this sector there is a large mass of potential entrants.
Each of them can produce multiple varieties and multiple versions of these varieties but it
has first to develop a ‘core version’ of a ‘core variety’ together with its production process.
This requires sinking an entry cost f targeted at a specific address z of a specific variety i in
the characteristics space, i.e. at a specific point (i, z) 2 I. Only after sinking this cost, the
15We work with a continuum of versions (i.e. with a continuum distribution of consumers’ ideal points)
rather than a discrete number of them as it is analytically convenient and leads to more elegant expressions.
As we will discuss in Section 3.2, this will not be associated with strategic interaction between firms as any
decision by a firm controlling a continuum of versions of a discrete number of varieties does not a↵ect market
aggregates.
16As Helpman (1981) we model the direct interaction between heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous
final producers. A similar logic can be extended to the case in which the interaction between heterogeneous
consumers and heterogeneous final producers is mediated by intermediaries. See Helpman (1985) for addi-
tional details.
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entrant discovers the marginal cost c associated with the core version z of its core variety i.
This cost is determined as the realization of a random draw from a continuous distribution
with cumulative density
G(c) =
✓
c
cM
◆k
, c 2 [0, cM ]. (2)
This corresponds to the case in which marginal productivity 1/c is Pareto distributed with
shape parameter k   1 over the support [1/cM ,1).17 As k rises, density is skewed towards
the upper bound of the support cM .
The marginal cost draw c for the core version of its core variety defines the entrant’s
‘core competence’. However, once c has been drawn, the entrant may also decide to o↵er a
countable set of non-core varieties as well as countable sets of non-core versions of its core
and non-core varieties.18 This faces, however, additional costs as it draws the entrant away
from its core competence. The ensuing loss of e ciency is modelled in terms of a ‘competence
ladder’. Specifically, let n = {0, ...,1} index the countable varieties the entrant may decide
to produce in increasing order of distance from its core variety (indexed n = 0) in the
product space I. Then, let m 2 [0, 1] index the versions of a variety the entrant may decide
to produce in increasing order of their clockwise arc distance from the core version along the
circle C, with m = 0 denoting the core version and m = 1 denoting the farthest version away
from the core one.19 Finally, let vn(m, c) denote the marginal cost of version m of variety n
for the entrant with core marginal cost c. Falling e ciency as the entrant moves away from
its core competence can be captured by assuming that vn(m, c) is an increasing function of
17The distributional assumption (2) yields, up to an additive shift, a Pareto distribution for firm size and
product sales that fits empirical patterns rather well. See Mayer et al (2014).
18Countability implies that the entrant may produce only a zero-measure subset of varieties. As in Mayer
et al (2014), this is imposed to remove cannibalization among varieties as well as strategic interaction among
entrants, thus preserving a monopolistically competitive environment no matter how many varieties each
entrant produces.
19Althoughm is a continuous variable, cannibalization is not an issue within variety as its di↵erent versions
do not compete for the same consumers (who demand only their ideal version). See Dhingra (2012) for a
study of cannibalization e↵ects in a demand system similar to ours. The implications of abstracting from
those e↵ects are also discussed in Mayer et al (2014).
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both n and m. For analytical convenience, we assume vn(m, c) = e!n+#mc where ! > 0 and
# > 0 respectively measure the di culty of introducing additional varieties and versions of
these varieties as the entrant moves away from its core competence.20 We will refer to !
as the ‘proliferation cost’ associated with broadening the range of varieties and to # as the
‘adaptation cost’ associated with broadening the range of versions.21
3.3 Seller Selection
The assumptions on preferences and technology imply that the equilibrium of the model is
symmetric in that at all addresses in the characteristics space all entrants and producers face
the same demand conditions, and all consumers face the same supply conditions.22 There
are, however, di↵erences across consumers in terms of the specific versions they consume of
the available varieties, and di↵erence across producers in terms of the varieties and versions
they supply.
Specifically, on the demand side, due to symmetry the measure of the set Iz of varieties
available at any given address z is the same for every z 2 [0, 1] and we denote this common
measure by N . Utility maximization then implies that also the inverse demand of a variety
i is the same at all addresses z 2 [0, 1] and equals
p(i) = ↵   q(i)  ⌘Q (3)
20Under our assumption that a consumer’s only demands her ideal versionm, the burden of adaptation falls
on the producer. Alternatively, one could assume that the producer does not provide any adaptation and,
instead, the consumer incurs a utility loss when consuming a non-adapted version. This may be captured
by ‘discounting’ the corresponding quantity consumed (‘quality adjustment’): if the producer supplies a
given quantity qp of the non-ideal version at variable cost cqp to the consumer, the latter’s utility is the
same as the one associated with a quantity qp/e!n+#m of her ideal version where 1/e!n+#m is the discount
factor. In this case the consumer substitutes ideal and non-ideal versions. Due to monopolistic competition,
price discrimination and multiplicative adaptation costs or quality adjustment, solving the producer’s profit
maximization problem reveals that the two alternative modelling options lead to isomorphic results.
21The model embeds Mayer et al (2014) when # goes to infinity and serving non-core customers bears
no di↵erential cost. It also embeds Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) when, in addition, ! goes to infinity and
producing non-core products is prohibitively expensive.
22We impose symmetry early on to streamline the presentation. A detailed discussion of how symmetry
emerges in equilibrium can be found in Carballo et al (2013).
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where q(i) is the quantity demanded of variety i, p(i) is its price, and Q =
´ N
0 q(i)di is the
total quantity demanded of all varieties at any given address. As there are L consumers at
each address, their combined demand is
Q(i) = Lq(i) = L

↵
⌘N +  
  p(i)
 
+
⌘N
⌘N +  
p
 
 
(4)
where p = (1/N)
´ N
0 p(i)di is the average price of all varieties available at any given address.
For variety i to be demanded at all at any given address, price must be low enough to satisfy
p(i)  1
⌘N +  
( ↵ + ⌘Np) ⌘ pmax (5)
where pmax  ↵ represents the price level at which demand (4) at the address is driven to
zero (‘choke price’). Lower pmax implies higher price elasticity of demand and this may be
driven by a larger measure (‘number’) of varieties available at the address or by their lower
average price p.
On the supply side, the profit an entrant with core marginal cost c earns from version m
of its variety n is then maximized for output level equal to
qn(m, c) =
L
2 
 
pmax   e!n+#mc
 
(6)
with corresponding price, markup, revenue and profit
pn(m, c) =
1
2
 
pmax + e
!n+#mc
 
(7)
µn(m, c) =
1
2
 
pmax   e!n+#mc
 
(8)
rn(m, c) =
L
4 
h
(pmax)
2    e!n+#mc 2i (9)
⇡n(m, c) =
L
4 
 
pmax   e!n+#mc
 2
(10)
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The entrant will produce at all only if it can make non-negative profit at least on the
core version of its core variety (m = n = 0). Given (10), this is the case if and only if
ce!n+#m  pmax for n = m = 0, i.e. if and only if c  pmax. Accordingly, the ‘choke price’
(5) determines a threshold that the core marginal cost c must not exceed for the firm to be
able to sell at least the core version of its core variety. We call this threshold the ‘cuto↵ cost’
and we denote it by cD. We then have cD = pmax and thus
cD =
1
⌘N +  
( ↵ + ⌘Np) (11)
where we have used the definition in (5). By (11), the cuto↵ cost at any given address
decreases with the number of varieties available at the address while it increases with their
average price.
3.4 Buyer Range and Buyer Mix
As long as its core marginal cost c does not exceed cD, the entrant may also decide to supply
additional non-core varieties (indexed n > 0). However, it will supply only those from which
non-negative profit can be earned at least on their core version (indexed m = 0). Given (10),
these are varieties such that n  n(c) where
n(c) = max {n | ce!n  cD}+ 1 (12)
is the entrant’s ‘product range’. By (12), the product range decreases with the adaptation
cost ! while it increases with the cuto↵ cost cD. It also decreases with the firm’s core
marginal cost c so that lower cost producers have a wider product range.
Of the varieties in this product range the firm will again produce only versions generating
non-negative profit. For a given n  n(c), (10) implies that these are versions such that
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m  m(c, n) where
m(c, n) =
1
#
h
ln
⇣cD
c
⌘
  !n
i
(13)
is the variety’s ‘buyer range’. By (13), for a given variety, the buyer range decreases with
the proliferation cost ! and the adaptation cost # while it increases with the cuto↵ cost cD.
It also decreases with the core marginal cost c and distance n from the core so that lower
cost producers and, for each producer, varieties closer to the core have a wider buyer range.
Analogously, we call ‘product mix’ and ‘buyer mix’ of a producer the distributions of
performance measures across its product and buyer ranges respectively. Due to the ‘compe-
tence ladder’, these distributions are not uniform. In particular, results (6)-(10) imply that
lower marginal cost e!n+#mc is associated with lower price as well as larger output, revenue,
markup and profit. Hence, lower cost producers (lower c) quote lower prices, command
larger markups, and achieve larger output, revenue and profit for the core version of the core
variety (m = n = 0). Moreover, for any producer, version m is cheaper, sells more and is
more profitable for varieties closer to the core variety (lower n). Lastly, for variety n of any
producer, versions closer to the core version (lower m) are cheaper, sell more and are more
profitable. This generates a ranking in performance across a producer’s varieties and the
versions of each variety it supplies, which maps into a ranking of customers whereby ‘core
buyers’ (who purchase core versions of core varieties) absorb more output, account for larger
revenue and generate more profit for the producer than non-core buyers. These di↵erences
between buyers are larger when the core cuto↵ cost is smaller as (6), (9) and (10) imply that
qn(m, c)/qn(m0, c), rn(m, c)/rn(m0, c) and ⇡n(m, c)/⇡n(m0, c) are decreasing functions of cD
for m < m0 and given n: the negative impact of tougher competition on output, revenue and
profit is less severe for versions closer to the producer’s core competence. Analogously, for
given m, the negative impact of tougher competition (smaller cD) on output, revenue and
profit is less severe for varieties closer to the producer’s core competence.
A final implication of results (6), (9), (10), (12) and (13) is that lower cost producers
(lower c) are bigger in terms of output, larger in terms of revenue, more profitable, and have
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richer product and buyer ranges.
3.5 Free Entry Equilibrium
Due to free entry, in equilibrium the expected profit for an entrant at any address has to
match the sunk entry cost. Due to symmetry, this requires
1X
n=0
(ˆ 1
0
"ˆ cDe !n #m
0
⇡n(m, c)dG(c)
#
dm
)
= f (14)
where, anticipating the cost cuto↵ cD, the term between square brackets is the (ex ante)
profit an entrant expects to earn on version m of variety n; the terms between curly brackets
is the (ex ante) profit an entrant expects to earn on all versions of variety n; and the outer
integral gives the (ex ante) profit an entrant expects to make from all versions of all varieties.
Due to the law of large numbers, these (ex ante) expected values equal the (ex post) average
realizations.
Given (2) and (10), equation (14) can be solved for the unique equilibrium core cuto↵
cost value
c⇤D ⌘
✓
⇥
  
L⌦
◆ 1
k+2
(15)
with
  ⌘ 2 (k + 2) (k + 1) (cM)k f , ⇥ ⌘ 1  e
 k#
k#
, ⌦ ⌘ 1
1  e k!
These bundling parameters can be interpreted as follows. As it increases with the entry
cost f and the highest possible marginal cost draw cM ,   > 0 measures the technological
barriers to e cient entry. As it decreases in the proliferation cost !, ⌦   1 measures the ease
of proliferation through the introduction of non-core varieties. In equilibrium the average
number of varieties per producer equals ⌦. As it decreases in the adaptation cost #, ⇥ 2 (0, 1)
measures the ease of adaptation through customized non-core versions of any given variety.
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In equilibrium the average share of consumers per variety equals ⇥.23 Expression (15) then
shows that higher entry barriers as well as higher proliferation and adaptation costs increase
the equilibrium cost cuto↵ c⇤D whereas larger market size (higher L) and stronger ‘love of
variety’ (lower  ) reduce c⇤D.
24
Note that, when adaptation is costless (# = 0), consumer heterogeneity is immaterial
(⇥ = 1) and (15) becomes the cuto↵ cost expression in the multi-product firm model by
Mayer et al. (2014). When, in addition, the introduction of non-core varieties is prohibitively
costly (infinite !), producers supply only core products (⌦ = 1) and (15) boils down to the
analogous expression in the single-product model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). For
infinite ! and positive #, consumer heterogeneity is not immaterial but only single-product
firms are active and only some of them sell to all consumers.25
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we also have to determine the number
of producers N that sell to any given consumer. By symmetry, this is also the number of
producers whose core competence coincides with the consumer’s address in the characteristics
space. To determine N , we use GnD(m, c) ⌘ G(c)/G(cDe !n #m) to denote the conditional
core marginal cost distribution of producers having the core version of their variety n at
distance m from the consumer’s ideal version of that variety:
GnD(m, c) =
⇥
c/
 
cDe
 !n #m ⇤k .
Then (7) can be used together with pmax = cD to write the price of the consumer’s ideal
version bought from one of those producers as
pn(m, c) =
1
2
 
cD + e
!n+#mc
 
.
23From this viewpoint, in the terminology of Arkolakis (2010) ⇥ would be called average ‘market penetra-
tion’.
24⌦ and ⇥ also decrease in k. As with larger k firms with high marginal production costs become more
frequent, both the average number of varieties per firm and the average share of consumers per variety fall.
25Even a small cost of adaptation is enough to prevent some firms (the least productive ones) from serving
all consumers: ⇥ < 1 for # > 0.
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The average price the consumer pays can thus be rewritten as
p ⌘
ˆ 1
0
"ˆ cDe !n #m
0
pn(m, c)dGnD(m, c)
#
dm =
2k + 1
2 (k + 1)
cD
which, due to symmetry, is the same for all varieties. Finally, substituting this result in (5)
together with pmax = cD allows us to solve the resulting equation for the number of sellers
per consumer, which in equilibrium becomes
N⇤ =
2(k + 1) 
⌘
↵  c⇤D
c⇤D
(16)
This is also the equilibrium number of producers with core competence coinciding with any
consumer’s address in the characteristics space while the associated number of entrants is
N⇤E = G(c
⇤
D)N
⇤ = (c⇤D/cM)
kN⇤.
Finally, the unique equilibrium core cuto↵ cost (15) also uniquely determines welfare as
measured by indirect utility
U⇤ = 1 +
1
2⌘
(↵  c⇤D)
✓
↵  k + 1
k + 2
c⇤D
◆
(17)
As this is a decreasing function of c⇤D, a reduction in the equilbrium core cuto↵ cost leads
to higher welfare. This is due to lower price as lower cuto↵ cost prevents higher cost firms
from selling and forces firms that eventually sell to retrench towards their core competence.
The resulting tougher selection of sellers, products and buyers allows for savings in terms
of proliferation costs and also adaptation costs as the average distance between buyers’ and
firms’ addresses is smaller.
3.6 Open Economy
In the open economy consumers have di↵erent addresses not only in the characteristics space
but also in the geographical space. Specifically, consider an arbitrary number of countries,
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indexed l = 1, ..., J , each of them replicating the structure of the closed economy discussed
so far. Countries di↵er in terms of size and geography. We use Ll to denote the population
(‘size’) of country l and ⌧hl > 1 to denote the ‘iceberg’ trade cost for exports from country
h to country l. Internal trade is, instead, free (⌧ll = 1). This implies that, for a producer
in country h with core marginal cost c, the delivered marginal cost of selling version m of
variety n to a consumer in country l is ⌧hle!n+#mc.
Exploiting again within-country symmetry, let pl denote the price threshold for positive
demand by any consumer in country l. Then, the ‘choke price’ for the consumer is
pl =
1
⌘Nl +  
( ↵ + ⌘Nlpl) , (18)
where Nl is the number of (domestic and foreign) sellers to the consumer in country l while
pl is their average (delivered) price. Assuming market segmentation, the profit a producer
in country h makes by selling version m of variety n to consumers in country l is
⇡nhl(m, c) =
Ll
4 
 
chl   e!n+#mc
 2
, (19)
where chl = pl/⌧hl is the cost cuto↵ for positive sales from h to l. As the producer sells only
if profit is non-negative, its product range in country l is
nhl(c) = max {n | ⌧hle!nc  cll}+ 1
where, due to free internal trade, cll = pl is the cost cuto↵ for domestic sales in country l.
Analogously, its buyer range in country l is
mhl(c, n) =
1
#

ln
✓
cll
⌧hlc
◆
  !n
 
.
Hence, both the product range and the buyer range are decreasing functions of the trade
cost. This implies that, all the rest given, only producers with low enough core marginal
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cost export, supplying more varieties and serving more consumers in the domestic than in
the export markets.
Also the product mix and the buyer mix are a↵ected by the trade cost. Output sold and
associated revenue for version m of variety n evaluate to
qnhl(m, c) =
Ll
2 
 
cll   ⌧hle!n+#mc
 
(20)
and
rnhl(m, c) =
Ll
4 
h
(cll)
2    ⌧hle!n+#mc 2i (21)
respectively while profit equals
⇡nhl(m, c) =
Ll
4 
 
cll   ⌧hle!n+#mc
 2
.
As these expressions decrease as cll decreases and at a faster rate for larger n and m, ceteris
paribus both the product mix and the buyer mix are more skewed in countries with lower
domestic cuto↵ cost. As in the closed economy, the negative impact of tougher competition
on output, revenue and profit is less severe for varieties and versions closer to the producer’s
core competence.
Due to free entry, expected profits of entrants have to be zero in equilibrium. Given (2)
and (19), this implies
JX
l=1
⇢hlLlc
k+2
ll = ⇥
  
⌦
h = 1, ..., J. (22)
where ⇢hl ⌘ ⌧ khl < 1 is a measure of the ‘freeness’ of trade from country h to country l
that varies inversely with the trade cost ⌧hl. The free entry conditions (22) yield a system of
J equations that can be solved for the equilibrium domestic cuto↵ costs in the J countries
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using Cramer’s rule. The resulting equilibrium domestic cuto↵ for country l is
c⇤ll ⌘
 
⇥
  
Ll⌦
PJ
h=1 |Chl|
|P|
! 1
k+2
(23)
where |P| is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix
P ⌘
0B@
1 ⇢12 · · · ⇢1M
⇢21 1 · · · ⇢2M
...
...
. . .
...
⇢M1 ⇢M2 · · · 1
1CA
and |Chl| is the cofactor of its ⇢hl element. Expression (23) shows that, as in the closed
economy, domestic cuto↵s are determined by local market size: ceteris paribus the domestic
cuto↵ cost is lower in a larger country. However, cross-country di↵erences in cuto↵s also arise
from di↵erences in
PJ
h=1 |Chl| / |P|, which is an inverse measure of geographical centrality
(‘market accessibility’). Thus, ceteris paribus central countries have lower domestic cuto↵
cost.26 For sellers, lower cuto↵ cost leads to more skewed product and buyer mix.
As in the closed economy, (18) can be used to relate the core cuto↵ cost with the mass
of sellers in country l:
N⇤l =
2 (k + 1)  
⌘
↵  c⇤ll
c⇤ll
. (24)
Then, given a positive mass of entrants N⇤E,h in country h, there will be N
⇤
hl = G(c
⇤
hl)N
⇤
E,h =
G(c⇤ll/⌧hl)N
⇤
E,h producers in h selling on average ⌦ varieties to a fraction ⇥ of consumers
in country l. Once the domestic cost cuto↵ and the number of sellers in each country are
obtained from (23) and (24) respectively, the corresponding mass of entrants can be found
solving the system N⇤l =
PJ
l=1N
⇤
hl for h = 1, ..., J .
Finally, the domestic cuto↵ in each country also uniquely determines its welfare as mea-
26When trade costs are prohibitively large, (23) boils down to the closed economy result (15).
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sured by indirect utility
U⇤l = 1 +
1
2⌘
(↵  c⇤ll)
✓
↵  k + 1
k + 2
c⇤ll
◆
(25)
As U⇤l is a decreasing function of c
⇤
ll, central countries benefiting from a large local market
enjoy higher welfare than peripheral countries with a small local market. As in the closed
economy, welfare gains arise from lower price as lower cuto↵ cost prevents higher cost firms
from selling and forces the remaining sellers to refocus on their core competence. Tougher
selection of sellers, products and buyers saves on proliferation and adaptation costs as the
average distance between buyers’ and firms’ addresses falls.
4 Toughness of Competition and Sales Concentration:
Empirical Evidence
The model developed in the previous section is consistent with the empirical findings high-
lighted in Section 2. In particular, a few exporters selling multiple products to multiple
buyers in multiple destinations account for relatively large shares of their countries’ exports
and, noteworthy, a relatively small set of main buyers is responsible for substantial fractions
of each firm’s foreign sales. It also generates additional predictions on how this importance
of dominant buyers is a↵ected by the toughness of competition in the destination countries.
In this section we precisely estimate these relationships, thereby contrasting the implications
of our theoretical model with the data.
4.1 Linking Theory and Empirics
In order to evaluate whether the relationships between toughness of competition and sales
concentration uncovered in the model are present in the data, we first need to be more precise
about them. To do this, first consider a variety n exported from country h to country l by a
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firm with core marginal cost c and two buyers of the variety in country l with ‘addresses’ m
and m0 > m so that the former buyer is closer to the firm’s core competence. By (21), the
export sales ratio between the two buyers is
rnhl(m, c)
rnhl(m
0, c)
=
(cll)
2    ⌧hle!n+#mc 2
(cll)
2   (⌧hle!n+#m0c)2
> 1 (26)
as the exporter raises more revenue from the core buyer than from the non-core buyer.
Moreover, the elasticity of the export sales ratio to the cuto↵ cost evaluates to
@ ln
⇣
rnhl(m,c)
rnhl(m
0,c)
⌘
@ ln cll
=   2 (cll⌧hle
!nc)2
 
e2#m
0   e2#m Q
m2{m,m0}
h
(cll)
2   (⌧hle!n+#mc)2
i < 0 (27)
where the sign is granted by m < m0. Accordingly, tougher competition (lower cll) raises the
export sales ratio of m to m0.27
As (27) holds for any m and any m0 > m, it has several parallel implications for the
exporter’s buyer mix that we can test with our data at the exporter-product-destination
level. First, if m is the main (dominant) buyer and m0 is any other buyer, then (27) implies
that tougher competition increases the main buyer’s sales share. Second, if m is the the
most important (main) buyer and m0 is the least important one, then (27) implies that
tougher competition increases the export sales ratio between them. Third, if m and m0 map
all buyers, then (27) implies that tougher competition increases the concentration and the
coe cient of variation of export sales across buyers.
The main challenge in testing these predictions is how to capture the ‘toughness of compe-
tition’ across destination countries. To tackle this issue we rely on the model’s association of
lower cll with larger market size and better market accessibility. Then, as our model embeds
Mayer et al. (2014) as a special case, we can follow their strategy proxying market size by
27We prefer not to emphasize the e↵ect of trade barriers/enhancers ⌧hl on the buyer mix of exporters as
this comparative statics result is very sensitive to the specification for the trade cost across di↵erent versions
of the same variety. Mayer et al. (2014) make the same point with respect to core and non-core varieties.
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GDP and market accessibility what they call ‘freeness of trade’. This is a country-HS2-level
indicator that corresponds to the contribution of barriers/enhancers to trade as obtained
by estimating a standard gravity equation (in logs) with both exporter and importer fixed
e↵ects using worldwide bilateral trade data at the HS2 digit-level and purging the trade flows
from these fixed e↵ects.28
We test our hypothesis of the positive relationship between the toughness of competition
at destination and the concentration in export sales by estimating the following specification:
log
 
Concentration iknhl(t)
 
=  1 ⇥ log
 
Toughness of Competitionkhl(t)
 
(28)
+  2 ⇥ (Trade Costshl) +  in(t) + "inhl(t)
where i, n and k index the firm, the product and the sector respectively, h and l refer
to the origin and destination countries respectively, and t denotes the year. We introduce
firm-product-year fixed e↵ects through  in(t) in order to control for time-varying unobserved
factors such as firm productivity and firm-product competences.
We choose the share of the main buyer for firm i in destination l and product n as
our baseline measure of the skewness of the buyer mix. This measure exists for the entire
support of the distribution of the number of buyers. In contrast, some of the other potential
measures (such as the ratio of the sales of the main buyer to the sales to other buyers)
are only computable for exports with more than one buyer. Moreover, we normalize the
share of the main buyer by the share that each buyer would have if export sales were evenly
distributed across all buyers. This normalization is made to control for the fact that the
same share of the main buyer may imply di↵erent degrees of concentration depending on
the firm’s number of buyers. Accordingly, the minimum value for the normalized share of
the main buyer is one when the firm has only one buyer. Figure 5 presents non-parametric
28See Appendix A.4 for additional details.
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estimates of the distribution of the normalized share of the main buyer in logs, both for each
exporting country and when pooling them together. This figure highlights, as expected, the
concentration of firms’ exports on few buyers and, in addition, the pronounced similarity of
distributions across the three countries. All our results remain qualitatively the same when
we use the raw, non-normalized share of the main buyer as dependent variable.
As mentioned above, our measures of the toughness of competition are GDP in destination
l and the freeness of trade in industry k and destination l. Based on our testable implications,
we expect these measures to have a positive impact on the normalized main buyer share, i.e.
 1 > 0 in our specification (28). Finally, we proxy trade costs by standard gravity variables
such as distance and indicators of contiguity and trade agreements (RTA) between pairs
of countries (See A Appendix-Data for a precise definition and sources of all explanatory
variables). All estimated coe cients reported are standardized to account for di↵erences
across scales in all the variables considered in the empirical analysis.
4.2 Results
Columns (1) to (4) in the upper panel of Table 5 show estimates of specification (28), using
the normalized main buyer shares as dependent variable and the measures of the toughness
of competition as main explanatory variables, obtained on pooled export flows from Costa
Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay over the period 2005-2008.29 In all specifications, we include
firm-product-year fixed e↵ects to account for firm-product factors that vary over time and
we cluster standard errors at origin-destination and sector-destination.30 In Column (1) only
two key covariates are considered: GDP and freeness of trade. All estimated coe cients are
29We have also estimated our baseline equation using the share of the main buyer normalized by the
median share. The results from this exercise confirm our findings and are available upon request.
30Since our main explanatory variable ‘freeness of trade’ is estimated, it might be of some concern that
our standard errors are not bootstrapped. Following Efron and Tbshirani (1994), we also estimated all our
specifications bootstrapping the standard errors, using 300 repetitions and defining the resampling cluster
at the firm level. Reassuringly, all our results still hold with bootstrapped standard errors. Furthermore, the
bootstrapped standard errors are smaller than those in the reported estimation where standard errors are
two-way clustered at origin-destination and sector-destination. That is why we decided to keep the estimates
based on the more demanding specification as our benchmark while making those with bootstrapped standard
errors available from the authors upon request.
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highly significant and have the predicted positive sign. In Column (2), we introduce GDP per
capita to control for taste di↵erences across countries tied to product quality and consumer
income (as in McCalman, 2016). The estimated coe cient on this new variable is not
statistically significant and those of GDP and freeness of trade are una↵ected. In Columns
(3) and (4), we include the battery of bilateral gravity controls and drop freeness of trade
to avoid collinearity. The estimated coe cients on GDP remains positive and significant.
Columns (5) to (8) in the upper panel of Table 5 present the same set of regressions where
the dependent variable is the raw main buyer share instead of its normalized version. The
motivation for doing so is twofold. First, these estimations show that our results do not
depend on the normalization choice. Second, one might be concerned that the positive
relation between the normalized main buyer share and market size could be generated by
exporter-buyer matches with stochastic transaction values as long as larger markets were
associated with a larger number of draws. This statistical benchmark, however, would not
be able to generate the positive relation between the toughness of competition and the raw
main buyer share as more draws would positively a↵ect only the denominator of the raw
share.31
The results reported in Table 5 thus provide strong empirical support to the testable
predictions derived from our theoretical model.32 Furthermore, we exploit the fact that
we have data for three di↵erent countries to evaluate the model’s predictions for each of
them. The toughness of competition has again a positive and significant e↵ect on sales
concentration in each of our sample countries, with some heterogeneity in the size of the
e↵ects across countries.33
In Table 6, we estimate variants of specification (28) that incorporate di↵erent sets of
31We also estimated all our benchmark specifications in the 2005 cross section of our data. As in Table
5, the results reveal a positive and significant relation between the toughness of competition and both the
normalized and the raw main buyer shares. Tables are available from the authors upon request.
32Estimates are also qualitatively similar when we use the normalized and the raw shares of the main
buyer rather than their logs or we run cross-sectional regressions for the other years of our sample. These
results are available from the authors upon request.
33Results are available from the authors upon request.
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conditioning fixed e↵ects. In all cases, the toughness of competition (as captured by GDP,
and freeness of trade) has a positive e↵ect on the normalized main buyer share. This is true
even under the most demanding specification including both firm-product-year and origin-
destination-year fixed e↵ects to control not only for time-varying firm-product factors but
also for time-varying origin-destination factors such as average transport costs or tari↵s.
Note that (origin-)destination-year fixed e↵ects directly absorb the influence of several of
the covariates that belong to the initial specification including GDP, distance, contiguity,
and trade agreements. In particular, the presence of destination-year fixed e↵ects implies
that our results do not depend on the market size of destination countries as this is absorbed
by these fixed e↵ects.
In addition, we re-estimate our baseline specification using alternative clusterings of stan-
dard errors to account for potential correlation across di↵erent dimensions in our data.
Specifically, we cluster standard errors by firm-destination, firm, destination-year, and des-
tination. The results of these alternative estimations are reported in Table 7. These results
confirm that the toughness of competition has a positive and significant e↵ect on the share
of sales going to the main buyer.
4.3 Robustness
Our theoretical model predicts that firms will concentrate their sales on their main buyer
when competition is stronger. We have shown that this prediction finds empirical support
when the toughness of competition is captured through GDP and freeness of trade. We now
check how robust this finding is to changes in our estimation strategy.
First, we consider alternative measures of the sales concentration in order to show that our
results do not hinge upon using the (normalized) main buyer share. Based on our discussion
in Section 4.1, some natural alternative concentration measures are: the export sales ratio
of the most important buyer to the least important buyer (B1/BL); the Herfindahl Index of
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export sales’ concentration (HI), and the coe cient of variation of export sales (CV).34 Table
8 reports estimates of (28) when using these three alternative measures. The estimation
results confirm that the toughness of competition is associated with more concentration of
sales towards the main buyers.
Second, so far we estimated the impact of the toughness of competition on the concen-
tration of the values of sales. However, using equation (20), we can show that the model also
predicts @ ln (qnhl(m, c)/q
n
hl(m
0, c)) /@ ln cll < 0 where m correspond to the core buyer and m0
is larger than m, so that the toughness of competition should have the same impact on the
concentration of quantities sold. We thus re-estimate our baseline specification and variants
thereof based on the alternative concentration measures using quantities sold instead of their
values. Table 9 reports the corresponding results, which support the model’s prediction that
competition is also associated with increased quantity concentration.
Third, according to our model, the impact of the toughness of competition on the concen-
tration of export sales should be amplified by adaptation costs (@2 ln (rnhl(m, c)/r
n
hl(m
0, c)) /@ ln cll@# <
0). Given that adaptation costs can be expected to be positively related to product di↵er-
entiation, the model then predicts that the toughness of competition should have a stronger
impact for di↵erentiated products. We investigate this prediction as an additional check that
our mechanism is indeed at work. In doing so, we rely on the product classification proposed
by Rauch (1999). Specifically, we interact our measure of toughness of competition with a bi-
nary indicator identifying each product type in the Rauch classification. The corresponding
results reported in Table 10 support the prediction of the model: across all specifications the
toughness of competition has the strongest impact for di↵erentiated products, being smaller
for referenced-priced products and only marginally significant or not significant at all for
homogeneous products.
Fourth, another concern might be that some of our results are driven by flows that have
only one buyer or other factors that a↵ect the distribution of sales across buyers such as
34As all these measures increase with the degree of concentration, we expect a positive impact of compe-
tition on them.
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vertical integration and trade intermediaries (in particular, large trading companies). We
therefore proceed to re-estimate specification (28) on samples that: (i) exclude export flows
with a single buyer; (ii) exclude export flows that correspond to vertically integrated firms as
identified using information from the WorldBase dataset (see Alfaro and Cheng, 2012); (iii)
exclude products for which intermediaries are more prevalent as determined based on data
from Ahn et al. (2011) (specifically, we drop products with share of intermediaries above
the median); and (iv) combine (i), (ii) and (iii) simultaneously. Estimates of the baseline
specification on these alternative samples are shown in Table 11. These estimates confirm
that tougher competition is associated with a larger normalized main buyer share.35
Finally, results are also similar when: (a) we change the aggregation level to firm-
destination instead of firm-destination-product; (b) we compute the freeness of trade at
a more disaggregated 4-digit HS level; (c) we exclude flows associated with trade in capital
and intermediate goods and with trade in consumer goods; and (d) we include country-year
random e↵ects to control for within destination-correlation (Wooldridge, 2006).36
5 Conclusion
We have used detailed data on exporters from Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay as well
as on their buyers to show that: aggregate exports are disproportionally driven by few
multi-buyers exporters; and each multi-buyer exporter’s foreign sales of any product are
in turn accounted for by few dominant buyers. We have then proposed an analytically
35As an alternative, we tackle the issue of intermediaries and large trading companies by removing from
our sample all firms with many partners, many products, or many destinations, either as an exporters or as
an importer. The rationale is that intermediaries and large trading companies tend to be in the upper tail
of the distribution in terms of the number of trade relationships. The results of using this restricted sample
confirm all of our findings and are available from the authors upon request.
36A set of tables with these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. Given the
sectoral concentration of our sample countries’ foreign sales, it could be that our estimates are mainly
driven by sectors that are particularly important for countries’ aggregate exports sales (such as oil products
for Ecuador, electronic circuits and data processing equipment products for Costa Rica, and animal and
vegetable products for Uruguay). To assess whether this is the case, we dropped firm-product-destination-
year flows for those origin country-sector combinations. All our findings turned out to be robust to dropping
these observations. A table with this additional check is also available upon request.
solvable multi-country model of endogenous selection in which dominant exporters, dominant
products and dominant buyers emerge in parallel as multi-product sellers with heterogeneous
technologies (i.e., with di↵erent ‘core competences’ in specific product varieties and in specific
versions of those varieties) compete for buyers with heterogeneous needs (i.e. with di↵erent
‘ideal versions’ of specific product varieties). We have shown that the model makes specific
predictions on how the relative importance of dominant buyers should vary across export
destinations depending on the toughness of their competitive enviroment as determined by
market size and market accessibility. We have finally shown that our data provide empirical
support to these predictions.
In addition to its positive predictions, our model has interesting normative implications.
In particular, in the model tougher competition raises welfare as it also allows for a better
match between consumers’ ideal versions and firms’ core competences. To better understand
how this welfare e↵ect materializes, it is useful to compare our model with the one by Help-
man (1981) when larger market size drives tougher competition. In Helpman’s model there is
no firm heterogeneity, there is only one product variety and consumers are continuously and
uniformly distributed along the circle representing the characteristics space of that product.
Due to increasing returns to scale, firms come in a discrete number, each supplying its unique
version of the product variety. Hence, available versions occupy a zero measure subset of the
circle, along which they are distributed at equidistant points. This implies that the proba-
bility a consumer finds a perfect match for her ideal version is zero and she has to make do
with the closest available version, su↵ering a utility loss that increases with the distance of
that version from her ideal one. However, as in a larger market there are more firms, the
distances between available versions are shorter and, thus, the average distance between a
consumer’s ideal version and the closest available version is shorter too. This reduces the
average mismatch and the associated utility loss. Moreover, due to increasing returns, the
larger market also o↵ers lower prices for available versions. On both counts, average utility
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is higher in a larger market.37
Di↵erently, in our model a consumer demands several di↵erentiated varieties, has an ideal
version of each di↵erentiated product variety and does not consume any other version (i.e.
the utility loss associated with the consumption of any non-ideal version is prohibitive). On
the production side, firms are heterogeneous and each of them has its own core version of the
varieties it supplies. This core version corresponds to the ideal version of some consumers
and can also be transformed in the ideal versions of other consumers by paying an additional
adaptation cost that increases with the distance between the firm’s core version and the
other consumers’ ideal versions. As the market gets larger, more firms enter and produce.
The resulting tougher competition forces existing producers to focus on their core versions.
Consumers whose ideal versions were initially further away from the firms’ core versions
are not served anymore and the corresponding varieties disappear from their consumption
baskets. This welfare loss in terms of product variety is, however, compensated by new
varieties supplied by new firms. Due to within-product selection, the distance between the
core and ideal versions of the new products is shorter than the distance between the core
and ideal versions of disappeared varieties. This is a novel channel through which tougher
competition improves welfare. In addition, as in Mayer et al. (2014), tougher competition
also reduces prices thanks to the compression of markups, to the selection of firms, varieties
and versions, and to the reallocation of expenditure shares towards core versions. For all these
reasons, average utility grows with the toughness of competition as market size increases.38
In this respect our findings also speak to the recent literature on measuring the welfare
37In address models the mismatch between buyers and sellers arises from the impossibility for the latter to
exactly cover all the heterogenous needs of the former due to limited resources. The mechanism is di↵erent in
search models where buyers and sellers cannot instantly find a good trading partner and have to go through
a costly search process balancing the loss of delaying trade against the option value of trying again and
maybe finding a better match. In search models a larger market can provide higher welfare in the presence
of ‘thick market externalities’, due for instance to increasing returns to scale in the matching function. See,
for example, Eaton et al. (2013) for a recent search model applied to importer-exporter relations; Antras
and Yeaple (2014) for a survey stressing the make-or-buy decisions of multinationals.
38If horizontally di↵erentiated intermediates were introduced as in Helpman (1985), another reason why
welfare would be higher when competition is tougher would be that the it would allow intermediate and final
producers to be better matched.
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gains from trade with heterogeneous agents (see, e.g., Arkolakis et al., 2012; Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare, 2014; Melitz and Redding, 2015; Arkolakis et al., 2017) as this literature
has so far typically focused on models in which sellers are heterogeneous but buyers are not
(see Bernard et al., 2017, on this specific point).
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6 Tables
Table 1
Aggregate Export Indicators
2005-2008
Costa Rica
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Exports 5,794 6,960 8,276 8,678
Number of Exporters 2,667 2,808 2,896 2,753
Number of Destinations 138 133 150 143
Number of Products 3,737 4,039 4,253 4,117
Number of Buyers 13,257 14,387 15,020 14,705
Ecuador
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Exports 9,265 12,400 12,817 19,494
Number of Exporters 2,223 3,052 3,370 3,962
Number of Destinations 127 143 147 151
Number of Products 2,238 2,579 3,081 3,086
Number of Buyers 8,769 11,311 11,782 12,243
Uruguay
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Exports 3,420 3,984 4,515 5,969
Number of Exporters 1,940 1,997 2,088 2,130
Number of Destinations 140 149 154 160
Number of Products 2,873 2,874 2,872 3,039
Number of Buyers 11,034 11,829 12,071 11,959
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports aggregate statistics for each country in our sample over the period
2005-2008.
Exports are in millions of U.S. dollars.
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Table 2
Decomposition of Bilateral Trade Flows
2005
All Costa Rica Ecuador Uruguay
Firm 0.436*** 0.439*** 0.385*** 0.550***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.042) (0.021)
Product Scope 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.028*** 0.061***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Buyer Scope 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.062***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Intensive Margin 0.470*** 0.450*** 0.548*** 0.327***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027)
Country Fixed E↵ects Yes No No No
Observations 403 137 126 140
2005-2008
All Costa Rica Ecuador Uruguay
Firm 0.156*** 0.195*** 0.107*** 0.214***
(0.022) (0.048) (0.025) (0.023)
Product Scope 0.021*** 0.027* 0.019** 0.009
(0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Buyer Scope 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Intensive Margin 0.791*** 0.749*** 0.845*** 0.727***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Country Fixed E↵ects No Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair Fixed E↵ects Yes No No No
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,726 560 564 602
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports estimated coe cients of equations: (1) lnMhl = ↵0+↵1 lnXhl+ c+"hl
for a given year (here 2005) and (2) lnMhlt = ↵0+↵1 lnXhlt+ hl+⌧t+µhlt for the entire
sample period (2005-2008) , where M corresponds to the following export margins: the
number of exporting firms, the products scope, the buyers scope, and average exports per
exporting firm, product and buyer that actually register trade.  c is a set of exporting
country fixed e↵ects,  hl is a set of country-pair fixed e↵ects, ⌧t denotes year fixed e↵ects,
and "hl and µhlt are the error terms, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported below the estimated coe cients in the left panel
(2005) and standard errors clustered by country-pair are reported below the estimated
coe cients in the right panel (2005-2008).
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
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Table 3
Distribution of Outcomes across Exporters - 2005
Costa Rica
10 25 50 75 90 95 99 Mean
Total Exports 1.2 5.5 34.5 321.5 2155.4 6046.2 34567.4 2172.6
Number of Buyers 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 13.0 25.0 72.0 6.4
Number of Market 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 6.0 10.0 18.0 2.9
Number of Products 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 12.0 21.0 51.0 5.3
Number of Buyers per Market 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 7.0 18.0 2.3
Number of Buyers per Product 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 8.0 27.0 2.6
Number of Buyers per Market-Product 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 11.0 1.6
Exports per Buyer 0.5 2.2 11.6 58.0 290.7 742.9 4838.9 334.9
Exports per Market 0.9 4.0 22.4 139.5 728.3 1906.9 11038.2 747.9
Exports per Product 0.0 0.3 2. 18. 155.4 624.4 5526.0 403.0
Exports per Market-Product 0.0 0.4 3. 22. 145.8 456. 3042.0 235.9
Exports per Market-Product-Buyer 0.0 0.5 3. 19. 103.1 295. 1909.0 146.7
Ecuador
10 25 50 75 90 95 99 Mean
Total Exports 0.0 2.6 27.9 259.1 2758.7 7894.9 44982.6 4167.9
Number of Buyers 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 10.0 18.0 45.0 4.2
Number of Market 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 8.0 16.0 2.2
Number of Products 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 7.0 11.0 27.0 3.0
Number of Buyers per Market 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 7.0 14.0 2.1
Number of Buyers per Product 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 23.0 2.3
Number of Buyers per Market-Product 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 11.0 1.6
Exports per Buyer 1.4 9.1 34.8 125.9 529.0 1372.5 10113.3 971.9
Exports per Market 0.3 8.3 47.8 253.8 1454.8 3945.8 19592.0 1871.7
Exports per Product 0.0 0.3 3.7 37.5 358.0 1469.6 14220.9 1351.0
Exports per Market-Product 0.0 0.7 9.0 75.0 460.2 1353.7 9546.0 894.3
Exports per Market-Product-Buyer 0.1 1.7 14.5 72.0 288.0 780.4 7082.0 538.9
Uruguay
10 25 50 75 90 95 99 Mean
Total Exports 1.5 4.9 27.7 242.6 1768.6 7143.4 38456.7 1763.5
Number of Buyers 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 11.0 24.0 92.0 6.2
Number of Market 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 7.0 11.0 24.0 2.8
Number of Products 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 13.0 29.0 3.6
Number of Buyers per Market 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 8.0 19.0 2.3
Number of Buyers per Product 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 6.0 10.0 36.0 3.0
Number of Buyers per Market-Product 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 11.0 1.7
Exports per Buyer 2.6 9.6 36.1 126.9 441.2 957.0 4319.2 281.2
Exports per Market 2.1 7.8 38.0 202.4 922.0 2195.4 10790.4 612.0
Exports per Product 0.1 0.5 4.0 43.0 347.4 1121.3 11529.2 488.5
Exports per Market-Product 0.1 1.1 9.0 60.5 316.5 793.1 4720.0 262.8
Exports per Market-Product-Buyer 0.3 2.1 14.2 64.0 224.0 516.4 2457.5 153.4
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports summaries statistics where 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90 denotes the percentile of each variable.
Exports are in thousands of U.S. dollars.
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Table 4
Multi-Buyer Premia
Sample: Firm Level
2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 1.127*** 0.517*** 1.063*** 0.619***
(0.080) (0.075) (0.080) (0.076)
Costa Rica 0.805*** 0.434*** 0.702*** 0.471***
(0.109) (0.102) (0.105) (0.103)
Ecuador 1.730*** 0.664*** 1.668*** 0.698***
(0.161) (0.144) (0.173) (0.153)
Uruguay 0.528*** 0.290** 0.428*** 0.341***
(0.130) (0.118) (0.126) (0.119)
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E↵ects No Yes No Yes
Destination Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes
2005-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.148*** 0.147***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Costa Rica 0.138*** 0.147*** 0.140*** 0.160***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Ecuador 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.188*** 0.183***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040)
Uruguay 0.097** 0.116*** 0.098** 0.110***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.039)
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed E↵ects No Yes No Yes
Destination-Year Fixed E↵ects No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed E↵ects Yes No No No
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports estimated coe cients of the multi-buyer premium where the dependent
variable is firm i total exports in year t; the Multi-Buyer Premium is a binary indicator
that takes the value of one if the firm has a firm-destination-product export flow with more
than one buyer in year t and zero otherwise. Firm characteristics include the number of
destination-product per year that firm serves and the number of buyers per year that the
firm has. The number of destination-products is the total number of unique destination-
product combinations in year t for firm i and the number of buyers is simply the total
number of buyers of firm i’s products.
Clustered standard errors at firm level are reported below the estimated coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
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Table 5
The E↵ect of Competition on Sales Concentration
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008
Normalized Main Buyer Share Raw Main Buyer Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP 0.364*** 0.360*** 0.370*** 0.376*** 0.055*** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.044***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.050) (0.053) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Freeness of Trade 0.638*** 0.643*** 0.068*** 0.078***
(0.091) (0.095) (0.017) (0.020)
GDP per capita 0.009 -0.011 0.019* 0.017
(0.034) (0.037) (0.010) (0.011)
Distance -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.025 -0.026
(0.088) (0.088) (0.021) (0.023)
Contiguity 0.043 0.043 0.010 0.010
(0.040) (0.039) (0.012) (0.012)
RTA 0.067* 0.065* 0.013* 0.017**
(0.034) (0.036) (0.007) (0.008)
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.403 0.402 0.402 0.803 0.803 0.805 0.805
Observations 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports standardized estimated coe cients (28) for all products. The dependent variables are the natural
logarithm of the normalized main buyer share in sales of product n from firm i in country h to destination l in year t
(Columns 1 to 4) and the natural logarithm of the raw main buyer share in sales of product n from firm i in country h to
destination l in year t (Columns 5 to 8). Number of Exporters: Number of other firms from the three sample countries
(Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay) exporting the same HS-2 product to the same destination in the same year. Freeness
of trade denotes a country-HS2-level measure obtained by estimating a standard gravity equation (in logs) with both
exporter and importer fixed e↵ects using worldwide bilateral trade data at the HS2 digit-level and purging the trade flows
from these fixed e↵ects. Specifications whose estimates are reported in Columns 5 to 8 include the number of buyers as
an additional covariate (estimates not presented). See A Appendix - Data for details on the other explanatory variables.
Standard errors clustered by origin-destination and sector-destination are reported below the estimated coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
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Table 6
The E↵ect of Competition on Sales Concentration
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008
Robustness: Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.241*** 0.255***
(0.013) (0.014)
Freeness of Trade 0.406*** 0.443*** 0.401*** 0.481*** 0.664*** 0.895***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.040) (0.075) (0.058) (0.134)
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Product-Year Yes No Yes No No No
Origin-Product-Year No Yes No Yes No No
Destination-Year No No Yes No Yes No
Origin-Destination-Year No No No Yes No Yes
Firm-Product-Year No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.347 0.330 0.362 0.434 0.446
Observations 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports standardized estimated coe cients alternative specifications of (28) for all
products. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the normalized main buyer share
in sales of product n from firm i in country h to destination l in year t. Number of Exporters:
Number of other firms from the three sample countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay)
exporting the same HS-2 product to the same destination in the same year. Freeness of trade
denotes a country-HS2-level measure obtained by estimating a standard gravity equation (in
logs) with both exporter and importer fixed e↵ects using worldwide bilateral trade data at the
HS2 digit-level and purging the trade flows from these fixed e↵ects. See A Appendix - Data for
details on the other explanatory variables.
Standard errors clustered by origin-destination and sector-destination are reported below the
estimated coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
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Table 7
The E↵ect of Competition on Sales Concentration
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008
Robustness: Alternative Clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.370*** 0.370*** 0.370*** 0.370***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.054) (0.080) (0.021) (0.028) (0.050) (0.071)
Freeness of Trade 0.638*** 0.638*** 0.638*** 0.638***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.091) (0.093)
Distance -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.304***
(0.025) (0.042) (0.088) (0.108)
Contiguity 0.043*** 0.043** 0.043 0.043
(0.014) (0.019) (0.040) (0.043)
RTA 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067* 0.067**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.034) (0.031)
Firm Cluster Yes No No No Yes No No No
Destination-Industry Cluster No Yes No No No Yes No No
Origin-Destination Cluster No No Yes No No No Yes No
Destination Cluster No No No Yes No No No Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.402
Observations 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports standardized estimated coe cients (28) for all products. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
the normalized main buyer share in sales of product n from firm i in country h to destination l in year t. Number of Exporters:
Number of other firms from the three sample countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay) exporting the same HS-2 product to
the same destination in the same year. Freeness of trade denotes a country-HS2-level measure obtained by estimating a standard
gravity equation (in logs) with both exporter and importer fixed e↵ects using worldwide bilateral trade data at the HS2 digit-level
and purging the trade flows from these fixed e↵ects. See A Appendix - Data for details on the other explanatory variables.
Standard errors clustered as indicated are reported below the estimated coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
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Table 8
The E↵ect of Competition on Sales Concentration
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008
Robustness: Alternative Concentration Measures
B1/BL HI CV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.543*** 0.541*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.204*** 0.202***
(0.050) (0.043) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Freeness of Trade 0.608*** 0.143*** 0.158***
(0.113) (0.040) (0.033)
Distance -0.297*** -0.070 -0.063*
(0.114) (0.056) (0.034)
Contiguity 0.010 0.029 0.009
(0.045) (0.025) (0.013)
RTA 0.075** -0.002 0.021
(0.034) (0.016) (0.015)
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.494 0.492 0.744 0.745 0.741 0.741
Observations 52,170 52,170 233,175 233,175 52,170 52,170
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports standardized estimated coe cients variants of (28) for all products. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of one of the following measures of concentration of sales of product n
from firm i in country h to destination l in year t across their buyers: the ratio of the sales to the main
buyer to the sales to the least important buyer (B1/BL), the Herfindahl Index (HI), and the coe cient
variation (CV). Number of Exporters: the natural logarithm of the number of other firms from the
three sample countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay) exporting the same HS-2 product to the
same destination in the same year. Freeness of trade denotes a country-HS2-level measure obtained by
estimating a standard gravity equation (in logs) with both exporter and importer fixed e↵ects using
worldwide bilateral trade data at the HS2 digit-level and purging the trade flows from these fixed
e↵ects. See A Appendix - Data for details on the other explanatory variables.
Standard errors clustered by origin-destination and sector-destination are reported below the estimated
coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
49
Table 9
The E↵ect of Competition on Sales Concentration
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008
Robustness: Weight Concentration Measures
MB SH B1/BL HI CV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP 0.360*** 0.366*** 0.535*** 0.532*** 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.160***
(0.053) (0.049) (0.046) (0.039) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.018)
Freeness of Trade 0.642*** 0.636*** 0.138*** 0.161***
(0.090) (0.096) (0.025) (0.040)
Distance -0.306*** -0.304*** -0.063** -0.083
(0.087) (0.101) (0.027) (0.058)
Contiguity 0.043 0.017 0.005 0.025
(0.039) (0.040) (0.010) (0.025)
RTA 0.068* 0.080** 0.017 0.002
(0.035) (0.034) (0.012) (0.018)
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.402 0.488 0.486 0.843 0.843 0.736 0.736
Observations 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175 52,170 52,170 52,170 52,170
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports standardized estimated coe cients variants of (28) for all products. The dependent variable is the
natural logarithm one of the following measures of concentration of the quantities (weight) sold of product n by firm i
in country h to destination l in year t across their buyers: the normalized main buyer share (NMBS), the ratio of the
sales to the main buyer to the sales to the least important buyer (B1/BL), the Herfindahl Index (HI), and the coe cient
variation (CV). Number of Exporters: the natural logarithm of the number of other firms from the three sample countries
(Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay) exporting the same HS-2 product to the same destination in the same year. Freeness
of trade denotes a country-HS2-level measure obtained by estimating a standard gravity equation (in logs) with both
exporter and importer fixed e↵ects using worldwide bilateral trade data at the HS2 digit-level and purging the trade flows
from these fixed e↵ects. See A Appendix - Data for details on the other explanatory variables.
Standard errors clustered by origin-destination and sector-destination are reported below the estimated coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
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Table 10
The E↵ect of Competition on Sales Concentration
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008
Robustness: Degree of Di↵erentiation and Adaptation Cost
Conservative Liberal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0.365*** 0.362*** 0.365*** 0.362***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055)
Di↵erentiated 0.706*** 0.708***
⇥ Freeness of Trade (0.109) (0.114)
Referenced-priced 0.607*** 0.609***
⇥ Freeness of Trade (0.069) (0.072)
Homogeneous 0.136 0.138
⇥ Freeness of Trade (0.096) (0.096)
GDP per capita 0.005 -0.079**
(0.033) (0.033)
Di↵erentiated 0.697*** 0.701***
⇥ Freeness of Trade (0.108) (0.113)
Referenced-priced 0.681*** 0.684***
⇥ Freeness of Trade (0.078) (0.082)
Homogeneous 0.157* 0.160*
⇥ Freeness of Trade (0.089) (0.089)
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.403 0.404 0.404
Observations 233,175 233,175 233,175 233,175
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports standardized estimated coe cients variants of (28) for all prod-
ucts. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the normalized main
buyer share in sales of product n from firm i in country h to destination l in year
t. Freeness of trade denotes a country-HS2-level measure obtained by estimating a
standard gravity equation (in logs) with both exporter and importer fixed e↵ects us-
ing worldwide bilateral trade data at the HS2 digit-level and purging the trade flows
from these fixed e↵ects. The sets of goods have been defined using basic categories
identified in the classification proposed by Rauch (1999) (conservative and liberal
version). See A Appendix - Data for details on the other explanatory variables.
Standard errors clustered by origin-destination and sector-destination are reported
below the estimated coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
51
Table 11
The E↵ect of Competition on Sales Concentration
Sample: All Exporting Countries, 2005-2008
Robustness: Alternative Samples
Nb2 Non-Vi Non-Intmd All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP 0.535*** 0.532*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.360*** 0.366*** 0.164*** 0.159***
(0.046) (0.039) (0.016) (0.015) (0.053) (0.049) (0.015) (0.014)
Freeness of Trade 0.636*** 0.207*** 0.642*** 0.243***
(0.096) (0.025) (0.090) (0.038)
Distance -0.304*** -0.097*** -0.306*** -0.077*
(0.101) (0.026) (0.087) (0.042)
Contiguity 0.017 0.017 0.043 0.027*
(0.040) (0.012) (0.039) (0.015)
RTA 0.080** 0.020* 0.068* 0.044***
(0.034) (0.011) (0.035) (0.012)
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.427 0.422 0.403 0.428 0.407 0.450 0.432
Observations 52,170 52,170 228,276 228,276 134,852 134,852 27,479 27,479
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
The table reports standardized estimated coe cients (28) for all products as obtained on three alternative samples: (i)
export flows with at least two buyers at the firm-destination-product level (Nb2); (ii) export flows that are not among
(vertically) related companies (Non-VI); (iii) exports flows in HS2 sectors where share of intermediaries is below the median
according to results from Ahn et al (2011) (Non-Intmd); and (iv) combining all (i) to (iii) restrictions (All). The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the normalized main buyer share in sales of product n from firm i in country h to
destination l in year t. Number of Exporters: the natural logarithm of the number of other firms from the three sample
countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay) exporting the same HS-2 product to the same destination in the same year.
Freeness of trade denotes a country-HS2-level measure obtained by estimating a standard gravity equation (in logs) with
both exporter and importer fixed e↵ects using worldwide bilateral trade data at the HS2 digit-level and purging the trade
flows from these fixed e↵ects. See A Appendix - Data for more details on the explanatory variables.
Standard errors clustered by origin-destination and sector-destination are reported below the estimated coe cients.
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ p < 0.10
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Figures
Figure 1: : Number of Buyers Distribution
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
Figure 2: : Number of Buyers Distribution - Aggregation
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
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Figure 3: : Multi-Buyers and Export and Firms Participation
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE, and DNA.
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Figure 4: : The Product Space with Taste Heterogeneity
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Figure 5: : Distribution of Normalized Main Buyer Share
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from PROCOMER, SENAE,
and DNA.
The figure depicts kernel density estimates of the distribution of the nor-
malized main buyer share for firms with more than one buyer in the pooled
sample and for each country separatedly in 2005. The kernel used in the esti-
mation is the Epanechnikov kernel and the bandwith is choosen to minimize
the mean integrated squared error.
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A Appendix
A.1 Buyer Data
The buyers of every single export transaction in our sample countries are recorded in the
respective customs export declaration. Since this information is not numerically coded, we
proceeed to homogeneize it before computing both the number of buyers and their shares for
each firm-destination-product-year combination. In so doing, we first standarized common
character strings in the buyer names. Second, we use probabilistic linking of buyers name
combined with a clerical review of all matched-pairs and unmatched observations.
A.2 Explanatory Variables
The definition and source of the explanatory variables are as follows:
• GDP: GDP PPP in common currency and constant prices, from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators.
• Distance: Distance between the countries’ capital cities, from CEPII.
• GDP per capita: GDP PPP per capita in common currency and constant prices from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
• Contiguity: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if countries share a border
and zero otherwise, from CEPII.
• RTA: Binary indicator that takes the value of one if trading countries have a trade
agreement and zero otherwise, from CEPII and WTO.
• Freeness of Trade: HS2-country level freeness of trade indicators computed from gravity
equation estimates as explained in Mayer et al, 2014, from COMTRADE data. See
section A.4 for details.
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A.3 Exports Decomposition
The decomposition underlying Table 2 works as follows. Total exports Xhl from origin
country h to destination country l can be expressed as
Xhl = N
⇤
hl ⇥
P
 2 xh Gl( , p)
N⇤hl| {z }
Product Scope
⇥
P
 2 xh Gl( , p,')P
 2 xh Gl( , p)| {z }
Buyers Scope
⇥ XhlP
 2 xh Gl( , p,')| {z }
IntensiveMargin
where N⇤hl is the number of firms exporting from h to l;  , p and ' are exporter, product
and buyer identifiers repectively;  xh is the set of exporters from h;
P
 2 xh Gl(·) denotes
the total number of unique combination of the arguments included in the Gl function. By
construction, the buyer scope is
BuyScp =
X
 2 xh
Gl( , p,')/
X
 2 xh
Gl( , p)   1
and, if all firms have only one buyer per product in destination l, then BuyScp = 1.
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A.4 Freeness of Trade
To estimate the ‘freeness of trade’, we follow Mayer et al. (2014). Our model generates a
gravity-like relation of bilateral exports with origin and destination countries’ characteristics
as well as their bilateral freeness
Xhl =
⌦⇥
2 (k + 2) (cM)
kNE,h⇢hl (cll)
k+1 Ll. (29)
that holds also within sector. This relation can be brought to data by running sector-by-
sector regressions for each year in our sample
lnXhl = FEh + ln ⇢hl + FEl + "hl
where FEh is an origin fixed e↵ect absorbing origin characteristics, FEl is a destination
fixed e↵ect absorbing destination characteristics, and "hl is an error term. The bundle
⌦⇥/
h
2 (k + 2) (cM)
k
i
is absorbed by the fixed e↵ects. The regression produces an estimated
⇢hl, which we use as our estimate of the bilateral ‘freeness of trade’.
The market accessibility of country l from country h is then computed as its multilateral
trade freeness dln ⇢hl = lnXhl   dFEh  dFEl
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